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I. INTRODUCTION
The role of the executive branch in enforcing immigration law is 
the subject of renewed focus. In the academic realm, the spotlight 
rests on the executive branch itself, as opposed to lumping together 
both Congress and the executive as the political branches.1 This 
?
? Professor of Law and Director, Law and Government Institute, Widener University Common-
wealth Law School.  This article is a part of an Association of American Law Schools sympo-
sium on executive power and the Obama administration.  Thank you to Raquel Aldana and 
Jennifer Chacón for organizing the symposium.  Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia provided insightful 
comments on this article.  
 1.  See, e.g., SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION (Ediberto Román ed.,
2015); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 
Yale L.J. (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter Cox & Rodríguez, Redux]; Adam B. Cox & Cristina 
M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458 (2010) [hereinafter Cox 
& Rodríguez, President and Immigration]; Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the 
Future of Immigration Law, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 31 (2012); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The 
Political Economies of Immigration Law, 2 UC IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2012); Lauren Gilbert, 
Obama’s Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in the Absence of Litigation Reform, 116 W.
VA. L. REV. 255 (2013); Cristina M. Rodríguez, Constraint Through Delegation: The Case of 
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new focus on the executive branch alone creates space for scholars 
to approach thorny separation of powers and federalism questions 
surrounding the president’s2 exercise of discretion in enforcing im-
migration law. In the political realm, the contours of the executive’s 
discretionary authority in immigration law have become a point of 
contention between the president and Congress and have seeped 
into the public discourse.3
This article adds to the renewed scholarly focus by examining 
across executive branch agencies the role of procedure in the presi-
dent’s exercise of authority over immigration law. This article ex-
tracts themes from some prominent procedural mechanisms that 
accompany executive power over immigration law. 
Traditionally, separation of powers doctrine in immigration law 
has focused on the balance of power between the political branches 
(Congress and the president) and the courts. The nineteenth century 
plenary power doctrine helped to establish this dynamic. The plena-
ry power doctrine established a plenary power to establish catego-
ries of entry and removability. It placed that unreviewable power with 
the political branches, and therefore not with the judiciary.4 As Adam 
Cox and Cristina Rodríguez have explained, however, the courts 
have not detailed how power over immigration law is, or should be, 
apportioned between the political branches.5
Turning attention away from the judiciary versus political 
branches question, and instead narrowing the field of view to the two 
political branches allows for examination of the roles of Congress 
and the president in immigration law. Decoupling Congress and the 
president in immigration law reveals that each plays a different role. 
?
Executive Control over Immigration Policy, 59 DUKE L.J. 1787 (2010); David S. Rubenstein, 
Immigration Structuralism: A Return to Form, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 81 (2013); 
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN.
PUB. INT. L.J. 243 (2010).  
 2.  In this article, I refer broadly to the president as the head of the executive branch.  
This article takes a broad look at executive procedural power in immigration law and does not 
delve into the complexity of executive branch structure and the allocation of power within the 
executive branch.   
 3.  See, e.g., WADHIA, supra note 1, at 88–108; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Se-
crets: Examining Deferred Action and Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U. N.H. L. REV. 1, 
21–27 (2012); Lawrence Downes, On Immigration, It’s Texas 2, Obama 0, N.Y. TIMES: TAKING 
NOTE (May 27, 2015, 3:18 PM), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/05/27/on-
immigration-its-texas-2-obama-0/. 
 4.  See generally Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 
581, (1889); see also Jill E. Family, Threats to the Future of the Immigration Class Action, 27 
WASH. U. J. LAW & POL’Y 71, 95–101 (discussing the plenary power doctrine). 
 5.  Cox & Rodríguez, President and Immigration, supra note 1, at 460–61. 
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The president’s power over immigration law derives from a vari-
ety of sources. Some are more obvious than others. One fairly obvi-
ous source is that Congress has delegated discretion to the 
executive in enforcing immigration law. For example, Congress has 
charged the Department of Homeland Security with “establishing na-
tional immigration enforcement policies and priorities.”6 Less obvi-
ous is that the president may have some inherent authority over 
immigration law based in the Constitution.7 This is authority that in-
dependently belongs to the president and does not depend on a 
delegation from Congress. 
Perhaps even less obvious is the power recognized by Profes-
sors Cox and Rodríguez. While Congress has formal statutory con-
trol over the categories and conditions of legal entry and 
removability, Cox and Rodríguez argue that the authority delegated 
to the president to enforce those statutory prescriptions gives the 
president “tremendous authority” to control who is removed.8 The 
president has this authority because the executive branch decides 
who is placed in immigration removal proceedings, who is granted 
relief from removal, and who is actually physically removed from 
among the population of those with final removal orders. Because 
the number of those who could be placed into removal proceedings 
is much larger than the number of those who are actually removed, 
executive branch choices determine the immigration futures of 
many.9 Part of the president’s immigration authority lies in this gap. 
The president’s authority over the gap (and, depending on funding, 
to determine the size of the gap) has a major effect on the composi-
tion of the immigrant community in the United States.10
This article is less focused on the sources and boundaries of 
the president’s power and more focused on the procedures used by 
the executive to carry out its power over immigration law. In immi-
gration law, the executive branch implements and, at times, creates 
procedural decision-making frameworks. The executive branch 
makes choices about what procedures it will use to exercise its 
power over immigration law. For example, will a U.S. Citizen receive 
?
 6.  6 U.S.C. § 202(5) (2002); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2009) (charging the Secretary 
of Homeland Security with “the administration and enforcement” of immigration law).   
 7.  Cox & Rodríguez, President and Immigration, supra note 1, at 461.  
 8.  Id. at 485. 
 9.  Id. at 511. 
 10.  Id.
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an explanation why her spouse will not receive permission to live in 
the United States? Will applicants for legal status be aware of how 
the executive branch will decide whether to grant them status? This 
article explores the nature and variety of executive procedural power 
over immigration law by looking at examples from executive agen-
cies that contribute to executive action in immigration law. The 
agencies are the Department of Homeland Security, the Department 
of Justice, the Department of State, and the Department of Labor. 
This article identifies themes across the procedures that these 
agencies use to carry out immigration decision-making. These 
themes are that the structure of executive branch implementation of 
immigration law is complex, that the use of guidance documents is a 
popular procedural choice, and that minimal process is a prominent 
feature. Also, this article raises some questions for future inquiry. 
The president’s procedural choices to implement his power over 
immigration law deserve sustained attention. Just as congressional 
procedural choices can greatly affect any statutory substantive law, 
executive branch procedural choices are an essential element of the 
president’s power over immigration law. 
II. THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF PROCESS IN IMMIGRATION LAW
To describe all of the procedures used by each agency with au-
thority over immigration law would fill a treatise (or two). By looking 
at examples of procedures from each agency, we can examine pro-
cedural power in immigration law across agencies, rather than fo-
cusing on one agency at a time. This sampling does not tell the 
whole story about the power of process in immigration law, but it al-
lows us to begin to see patterns across agencies and to raise ques-
tions for future inquiry. For each agency, this article focuses on a 
prominent procedural approach that is the subject of recent or ongo-
ing litigation, or that has otherwise raised controversy. 
A. Executive Power Over Immigration Law Across Agencies
1. Department of Homeland Security: ICE, USCIS, and CBP
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) contains three 
entities with power over the implementation of immigration law: (1) 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); (2) United States Citi-
zenship and Immigration Services (USCIS); and (3) Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP). This section will discuss how ICE has 
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made the procedural choice to use guidance documents to exercise 
its prosecutorial discretion, how USCIS relies on guidance docu-
ments in its adjudication of applications for immigration benefits, and 
how CBP uses procedures based in minimal process to adjudicate 
applications for admission to the United States. 
a. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Immigration and Customs Enforcement is tasked with interior 
enforcement. Among other things, ICE conducts workplace en-
forcement raids, charges foreign nationals with removability, and 
maintains a vast network of immigration detention facilities.11 In its 
operations, ICE exercises vast discretion over who is charged with 
removability and placed into enforcement proceedings. ICE exercis-
es this power through prosecutorial discretion.12
Study of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in immigration 
law makes up a significant part of renewed scholarly focus on exec-
utive power in immigration law.13 While the executive branch’s use 
of prosecutorial discretion in immigration law is not new,14 the prac-
tice has recently received increased attention due to a stalemate 
over immigration reform in Congress and the president’s an-
nouncement of two policies to provide temporary reprieve from re-
moval to two groups. In the absence of legislative changes to the 
immigration law statutes, advocates have pushed for the president 
to use his sphere of power over immigration law to make all possible 
changes to immigration law policy.15
Again, prosecutorial discretion in immigration law is not new. 
For example, John Lennon received it in the 1970’s, and the execu-
tive has used this power in varying forms for many years.16 Three 
?
11.  What We Do, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
http://www.ice.gov/overview (last visited on Sept. 12, 2015). 
 12.  As discussed below, USCIS and CBP exercise prosecutorial discretion as well. 
 13.  See, e.g., Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 1. 
 14.  Id. at 246–65; see also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The History of Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion in Immigration Law, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 101, 109–11 (2015).  
 15.  See, e.g., Marshall Fitz, What the President Can Do if Congress Fails to Act, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 2014); Elise Foley, Dreamers at State of the Union Hope Obama 
Continues to Push Forward on Immigration, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 21, 2015, 2:59 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/21/obama-dreamers_n_6508692.html; Wadhia, Shar-
ing Secrets, supra note 3, at 27–32; Wadhia, The History of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra
note 14, at 107–09. 
 16.  Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 1, at 246–65; see also Mi-
chael A. Olivas, Dreams Deferred: Deferred Action, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Vexing 
Case(s) of Dream Act Students, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 463, 475–92 (2012). 
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 39 Side B      12/28/2015   14:43:02
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 39 Side B      12/28/2015   14:43:02
3?FAMILY?FINAL?(DO?NOT?DELETE)? 12/24/2015??5:28?PM?
64 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 91:1
recent prominent examples include the efforts of ICE in 2011 to bet-
ter coordinate and centralize its prosecutorial discretion efforts, the 
executive branch’s implementation of Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA), and the proposed implementation of Deferred Ac-
tion for Parental Accountability (DAPA). 
In 2011, ICE announced to its field office directors that they 
should implement new prosecutorial discretion practices within their 
respective districts.17 Building on agency memoranda dating back to 
1976, the “Morton Memorandum” (named after former ICE Director 
John Morton, the author of the memorandum) established guidance 
on the agency’s prosecutorial discretion priorities and information 
about who within ICE may exercise prosecutorial discretion. Accord-
ing to the memo, its purpose is to “ensure that the agency’s immi-
gration enforcement resources are focused on the agency’s 
enforcement priorities.”18 Citing limited resources, the Morton Memo-
randum explains that ICE must “regularly” exercise prosecutorial 
discretion.19 The memo lays out a non-exhaustive list of factors that 
authorized ICE agents “should” consider in deciding whether to ex-
ercise prosecutorial discretion, and thus not to pursue enforce-
ment.20 According to the memo, no one factor is determinative.21
Examples of factors include: age; criminal history; circumstances of 
arrival in the United States (did the person arrive as a child?); length 
of presence in the United States; pursuit of education in the United 
States; the existence of U.S. citizen children; and the person’s ties 
to the community.22
The Morton Memorandum also mentioned “the agency’s civil 
immigration enforcement priorities” as a factor for consideration in 
determining whether to prosecute.23 These priorities previously were 
discussed in another memorandum, also authored by then-Director 
?
 17.  Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to All Field 
Office Directors, All Special Agents in Charge, & All Chief Counsel, Exercising Prosecutorial 
Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the 
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011) (on file at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf). 
 18.  Id.
 19.  Id.
 20.  Id.
 21.  Id.
 22.  Id.
 23.  Id.
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Morton.24 In the memorandum, Morton explained that ICE has funds 
to remove less than four percent of the undocumented foreign na-
tional population.25 The memorandum announced a hierarchal order 
of attention. The highest priority was assigned to those foreign na-
tionals who “pose a danger to national security or a risk to public 
safety.”26 Priority two was assigned to recent illegal entrants. Priority 
three was focused on fugitive foreign nationals or those who have 
otherwise obstructed immigration controls.27
To further these policies, ICE announced a case-by-case review 
of pending enforcement actions in November 2011.28 This memo-
randum directed ICE attorneys to look for cases where prosecutorial 
discretion would be appropriate, based on the standards laid out in 
previous ICE directives, including the two memoranda authored by 
Director Morton described above. ICE attorneys were directed to 
“decide whether [removal] proceedings . . . should continue or 
whether prosecutorial discretion in the form of administrative closure 
is appropriate.”29 As described below, these prosecution priorities 
evolved again in November 2014.30
In June 2012, then Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Na-
politano authored a memorandum announcing the DACA initiative.31
The memorandum explains that “in the exercise of our prosecutorial 
discretion,” DHS (including ICE) should exercise its discretion and 
not pursue enforcement against certain individuals who arrived in 
the United States as children.32 Exercises of discretion are appropri-
?
 24.  Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to All ICE 
Employees, Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and 
Removal of Aliens (Mar. 2, 2011) (on file at
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf).  
 25.  Id.
 26.  Id.
 27.  Id.
 28.  Memorandum from Peter S. Vincent, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enf’t, to All Chief Counsel & Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, Case-by-Case Re-
view of Incoming and Certain Pending Cases (Nov. 17, 2011) (on file at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/case-by-case-review-incoming-certain-
pending-cases-memorandum.pdf).  
 29.  Id.
 30.  See infra notes 43–49. 
 31.  Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of the Homeland Sec., to David 
Aguilar et al., Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Exercising Prosecutorial Discre-
tion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012) 
(on file at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-
who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf).  
 32.  Id.
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ate for those who: (1) arrived before the age of 16; (2) have continu-
ously resided in the United States for five years before the date of 
the memorandum; (3) are present in the United States on the date of 
the memorandum; (4) are in school, have graduated from high 
school, have a GED, or who have been honorably discharged from 
the U.S. military; (5) have no felony convictions, no convictions for a 
significant misdemeanor offense, or no multiple misdemeanor of-
fenses, or who otherwise are not a public safety threat; and (6) are 
less than the age of thirty-one.33 In 2014, President Obama an-
nounced a “second generation” version of DACA that would elimi-
nate the age cap, among other changes. DACA 2.0 has not been 
implemented due to ongoing litigation.34
The original DACA memorandum set the stage for the imple-
mentation of a new application procedure within USCIS, also a part 
of DHS. While ICE is focused on charging, detention, and removal, 
USCIS administers the granting of immigration benefits, such as the 
grant of lawful immigration status.35 Through a series of answers to 
“Frequently Asked Questions,” (FAQ) USCIS laid out how it would 
accept and consider applications for prosecutorial discretion under 
DACA, including a special application form with instructions.36 As the 
answers to the FAQ reveal, a DACA grant does not result in a legal 
immigration status, but results in a revocable promise from the gov-
ernment not to enforce for a specific period of time.37 Also, those 
foreign nationals granted deferred action under DACA are eligible to 
apply for permission to work in the United States pursuant to a pre-
existing regulation governing work authorization.38
Two years after the implementation of DACA, President Obama 
announced a similar initiative called DAPA.39 DAPA also does not 
grant legal status, but it offers deferred action to the parents of U.S. 
?
 33.  Id.
 34.  Executive Actions on Immigration, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.uscis.gov/immigrationaction (last visited Aug. 29, 2015); 
see infra note 56. 
 35.  About Us, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
http://www.uscis.gov/aboutus (last visited Aug. 29, 2015). 
 36.  Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-
arrivals-process/frequently-asked-questions (last updated June 15, 2015). 
 37.  Id.
 38.  Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2015). 
 39.  Fixing the System: President Obama is Taking Action on Immigration, WHITE HOUSE 
(Nov. 20, 2014) (video available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/immigration/immigration-
action#).
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citizen children and to the parents of children who are lawful perma-
nent residents (“green card” holders) of the United States.40 Those 
parents who are granted deferred action under DAPA are eligible to 
apply for work authorization based on a pre-existing regulation.41
Through an agency memorandum, the executive branch announced 
the DAPA eligibility criteria: (1) continuous residence in the United 
States since January 1, 2010; (2) an existing U.S. citizen or lawful 
permanent resident son or daughter as of November 20, 2014; (3) 
physical presence in the United States as of November 20, 2014 
and at the time of application; and (4) that the individual is not an en-
forcement priority.42 USCIS would adjudicate applications for de-
ferred action under DAPA. 
Contemporaneously, DHS released a new priorities and prose-
cutorial discretion memorandum.43 This memorandum rescinds the 
2011 memoranda described above and establishes three priority 
categories. The highest priority, “Priority 1,” is reserved for individu-
als who the government categorizes as threats to national security, 
border security, or public safety.44 Enforcement resources should be 
concentrated on this category, which includes terrorism suspects, 
those apprehended at the border, and foreign nationals convicted of 
an “aggravated felony” (as that term is defined in the Immigration 
and Nationality Act).45 “Priority 2” belongs to misdemeanants and 
new immigration violators.46 This category includes those convicted 
of three or more misdemeanors, those convicted of a “significant 
misdemeanor,” and foreign nationals who are apprehended after en-
tering the United States without permission and who have not been 
?
 40.  Id.
 41.  8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2015).
 42.  Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Leon 
Rodriguez et al., Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Exercising Prosecutorial Discre-
tion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect 
to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents 4, 5 (Nov. 
20, 2014) (on file at  
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf). 
43.  See generally Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski et al., Acting Dir., Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Policies for the 
Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20, 2014) (on file 
at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pd
f) [hereinafter Enforcement Memo].  
44.  Id. at 3. 
 45.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2015). 
 46.  Enforcement Memo, supra note 43, at 3. 
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present in the United States since January 1, 2014.47 “Priority 3” be-
longs to other immigration violators (including those whose legal sta-
tus has expired) and represents the lowest priority for 
enforcement.48 ICE maintains a list of frequently asked questions on 
its website that helps to explain its prosecutorial discretion policies.49
While prosecutorial discretion is a mainstay feature of immigra-
tion enforcement, recent prosecutorial discretion efforts also are 
linked to the failure to achieve statutory reform of immigration law. 
For almost ten years, Congress has considered, but failed to 
achieve, statutory immigration law reform. DACA is not the statutory 
reform sought through the DREAM Act.50 The DREAM Act would 
place undocumented foreign nationals who arrived as children on 
the path to legal status in the United States, and eventual possible 
U.S. citizenship. DACA, on the other hand, only grants a temporally 
limited, revocable promise not to enforce and is not a legal status it-
self. The ICE memoranda setting enforcement priorities are the 
product of a scenario where a failure to update the congressionally 
chosen legal immigration categories and quotas, in addition to other 
complex forces, led to an undocumented population in the United 
States estimated at 11 million.51 Because the immigration statutes 
are so harsh when it comes to the granting of relief from removal 
and are so broad in terms of who is eligible for removal, the statutes 
have made the executive branch the pressure point.52 A decision not 
to enforce is the only hope for millions. 
These prosecutorial discretion policies are not without their crit-
ics. Critics challenge as unconstitutional President Obama’s efforts 
to exercise executive branch immigration power through these pros-
?
 47.  Id. at 3–4. 
 48.  Id. at 4. 
 49.  Frequently Asked Questions Relating to Executive Action on Immigration, U.S.
IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
https://www.ice.gov/immigrationAction/faqs (last visited Aug. 29, 2015). 
 50.  See generally IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR, COMPARISON CHART: DACA, CALIFORNIA 
DREAM ACT, AB 540, AND DREAM ACT (2012), http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/ilrc-
daca_comparison_chart-2012-10_10.pdf.   
 51.  See generally Jens Manuel Krogstad & Jeffrey S. Passel, 5 Facts About Illegal Immi-
gration in the U.S., PEW RESEARCH CTR. (July 24, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2015/07/24/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/. 
 52.  See WADHIA, supra note 1, at 13; Jason Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 661 (2015); Cox & Rodríguez, President and Immigration, supra note 1, at 
511–19; Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 1, at 252–53, 256, 270–72.  
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ecutorial discretion initiatives.53 Critics argue that congressional 
stalemate is not a constitutional justification for the executive branch 
to usurp the lawmaking power, and that the DACA and DAPA initia-
tives are unconstitutional breaches of the president’s duty to execute 
the laws faithfully.54 An additional argument is that DAPA violates 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).55 A district court judge en-
joined the implementation of DAPA and DACA 2.0 because the 
judge concluded that the executive’s use of an agency guidance 
document, rather than notice and comment rulemaking, violated the 
APA.56 That decision is under consideration by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.57 Others, including myself, have argued 
that these policies are well within the power of the executive and 
that DAPA does not violate the APA.58
My purpose here is not to reiterate the debate over legality, but 
rather to emphasize that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion re-
quires procedural choices. These choices include how, if at all, to 
formulate and announce prosecutorial discretion policies, and what 
kinds of procedural mechanisms, if any, will accompany the process 
to decide whether prosecutorial discretion should be granted to an 
individual. In the prosecutorial discretion examples discussed above, 
DHS chose to announce its policies through guidance documents, 
?
 53.  Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015); Crane v. Na-
politano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 724, 730 (N.D. Tex. 2013); Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, 
Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM 
Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784 (2013). 
 54.  Id.
 55.  Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 647. 
 56.  Id. at 677. 
 57.  Ariane de Vogue, Legal Fight over Obama’s Immigration Orders May Outlast His 
Presidency, CNN POL. (Sept. 29, 2015) http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/29/politics/immigration-
obama-lawsuit-delays/. 
 58.  See Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on Oversight, Agency 
Action, Federal Rights and Federal Courts, 114th Cong. 1, 2 (2015) (written testimony of Jill E. 
Family), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/03-19-
15%20Family%20Testimony.pdf; see also Open Letter from Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Clini-
cal Professor of Law, Pa. State Univ., et al. (Mar. 13, 2015) (on file at 
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/LAWPROFLTRHANENFINAL.pdf); Open Letter from Hiro-
shi Motomura, Professor of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law, et al. (Nov. 25, 2014) (on file at
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdfs/Immigrants/executive-action-
law-prof-letter.pdf); see generally Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised Enforcement Dis-
cretion, and the Litigation Over Administrative Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV.
DISCOURSE 58 (2015); David A. Martin, A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion: 
The Legal and Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach’s Latest Crusade, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 167 
(2012), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/a-defense-of-immigration-enforcement-discretion-
the-legal-and-policy-flaws-in-kris-kobachs-latest-crusade; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Re-
sponse: In Defense of DACA, Deferred Action, and the DREAM Act, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 
59 (2013).
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rather than notice and comment rulemaking. Even though it chose 
guidance documents over public notice and comment, DHS chose to 
be transparent in its memoranda about the things it will think about 
when deciding whether to grant prosecutorial discretion. 
b. Interlude: Guidance Documents 
As the following discussion reveals, DHS is not the only immi-
gration agency that relies on guidance documents. These rules are 
not formulated through the notice and comment procedures of the 
APA.59 When an agency uses such rules correctly under the APA, 
the APA does not require the agency to seek comment from the 
public or to respond to any comments.60 These rules therefore short-
circuit what many think of as the “normal” rulemaking function under 
the APA—an agency posts a proposed rule, accepts public com-
ment, considers those comments, and then publishes a final rule 
that responds to the comments. 
One type of guidance document is a policy memorandum, 
which is a memorandum from a high-ranking agency official to lower 
ranking agency officials on some topic within the agency’s enforce-
ment power.61 The APA recognizes “general statements of policy” as 
an exception to its notice and comment rulemaking requirements.62
The APA defines a “rule” to include both legislative (legally binding) 
and non-legislative (not legally binding) rules.63 Therefore, a policy 
statement still contains a “rule” under the APA. 
Guidance documents are helpful in that they allow for a form of 
communication from the agency to regulated parties and to the pub-
lic in addition to notice and comment rulemaking.64 Through policy 
memoranda, regulated parties and the public can get a sense of the 
agency’s ideas on a particular issue. Policy statements let regulated 
parties know how the agency plans to exercise its enforcement 
power. Given the enormity of the statutory gaps that agencies often 
must fill, the limited resources of agencies, and the cost and time 
commitments required to engage in notice and comment rulemak-
?
 59.  5 U.S.C. § 553 (2015). 
 60.  5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2015). 
 61.  Jill E. Family, Administrative Law Through the Lens of Immigration Law, 64 ADMIN. L.
REV. 565, 570–71 (2012). 
 62.  5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2015). 
 63.  5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2015). 
 64.  Family, Administrative Law, supra note 61, at 578–79. 
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ing, guidance documents are an important tool both for agencies 
and regulated parties.65
Guidance documents are not legally binding, however. That 
means that in an enforcement action where a policy statement is at 
issue, either the agency or a regulated party is free to argue that a 
different rule should apply other than that expressed in a policy 
statement.66 Also, because a guidance document is not legally bind-
ing, it is relatively easy for an agency to change positions by issuing 
a new policy memorandum. Instead of enduring other rounds of no-
tice and comment, an agency simply issues a new policy memoran-
dum to update its plans or outlook towards a particular issue.67
Elsewhere I have detailed the problems caused by reliance on 
guidance documents.68 The use of guidance documents raises con-
cern generally in administrative law that agencies are seeking to 
avoid the procedural obligations of notice and comment rulemaking. 
The procedural protections of notice and comment rulemaking are 
neutered if agencies regularly circumvent them through the use of 
guidance documents. For an agency short on resources, following 
the policy memorandum procedural path to make a rule is less cum-
bersome and time-consuming. It also may be less visible if the 
agency wants to keep a low profile on a particular issue. 
Another concern is that agencies use policy memoranda to bind 
practically, even if not legally.69 Even though rules announced 
through policy memoranda are not legally binding, a regulated party 
probably will feel obligated to comply with the policy announced in 
the memorandum. Following the memo presents the path of least 
resistance because the content of the memo represents the position 
the agency most likely will take in any enforcement action. There-
fore, policy memoranda have a practically binding effect, even if they 
are not legally binding, and that practical effect arises without the 
procedural protections of notice and comment rulemaking.70
?
 65.  Id.
 66.  Id. at 572. 
 67.  Id. at 599–604. 
 68.  Family, Administrative Law, supra note 61; see generally Jill E. Family, Easing the 
Guidance Document Dilemma Agency by Agency: Immigration Law and Not Really Binding 
Rules, 47 MICH. J. L. REFORM 1 (2013). 
 69.  See Family, Administrative Law, supra note 61, at 566; Family, Easing the Guidance 
Document Dilemma, supra note 68, at 35. 
 70.  Id.
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Transparency is also a problem when it comes to guidance 
documents. While issuing a guidance document is more transparent 
than saying nothing, regulated parties complain that they are unfa-
miliar with the process used to formulate guidance documents.71
This is true in both immigration law and administrative law general-
ly.72 The formulation process is often a mystery, with a memoran-
dum simply posted to an agency website or circulated through 
informed legal circles.73
c. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
ICE is not the only immigration agency to rely on guidance doc-
uments. Recent efforts at shaping enforcement priorities are high 
profile, but the executive exercises other types of discretion in immi-
gration law that are just as consequential. While the executive does 
exercise control over removal, the executive branch also exercises 
control over who may gain legal status in the United States. USCIS 
exercises this power. The focus here shifts from those who are re-
movable to those who are seeking legal status in the United States. 
These are individuals who are seeking approval, who are arguing 
that he or she fits within the categories and quotas of legal immi-
grants established by Congress. For example, a pharmaceutical 
company may wish to employ a foreign national scientist in the Unit-
ed States, a U.S. citizen may wish to sponsor his or her spouse for 
lawful permanent residence, a U.S. technology company may wish 
to temporarily employ a foreign national, a U.S. citizen may wish to 
employ a foreign national as a home health aide, or a foreign na-
tional may wish to apply for naturalization. While Congress sets the 
general categories and quotas, the executive branch fills in the de-
tails and actually adjudicates benefit applications.74
USCIS maintains a network of adjudication offices and centers 
that process about seven million applications per year.75 Overall, 
USCIS employs about 18,000 individuals at various types of facili-
?
 71.  Family, Easing the Guidance Document Dilemma, supra note 68, at 35–36. 
 72.  See generally id. at 35–36, 44–48. 
 73.  USCIS does post some draft memoranda for comment, but that practice raises its 
own questions.  Family, Administrative Law, supra note 61, at 608–15. 
 74.  About Us, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
http://www.uscis.gov/aboutus (last visited Aug. 29, 2015). 
 75.  Attachs. to Appellant’s Emergency Mot. for Stay Pending Appeal, Attach. 6, Declara-
tion of Donald Neufeld, at 2, Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 
2015). 
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ties. There are four service centers and eighty-seven field offices. 76
USCIS’s budget is about $3.2 billion.77 About ninety-five percent of 
the budget comes from user fees.78 For most cases, the foreign na-
tional selects the appropriate USCIS form, completes it, and mails it 
to a USCIS Service Center with the appropriate fee and supporting 
documentation.79 USCIS then adjudicates the application, either 
granting it or issuing a Request for Evidence (RFE).80 If the re-
sponse to the RFE is not adequate, USCIS will deny the application. 
The field offices provide direct, in-person services to foreign nation-
als.81 In-person interviews, for example, take place at field offices. 
Sometimes an application requires adjudication at both a service 
center and a field office. There is an appellate administrative body 
within USCIS called the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO).82
During an adjudication, a USCIS adjudicating officer looks to 
many sources of law. There is the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
regulations, and an array of agency guidance documents. Many im-
portant questions critical to the adjudication of immigration law bene-
fits are in agency memoranda.83 The USCIS Policy Manual contains 
twelve volumes.84 For example, Volume 12, which covers citizenship 
and naturalization, contains twelve parts and sixty-three chapters.85
A U.S. citizen who wishes to obtain lawful permanent resident 
status for his or her spouse might not know that many issues affect-
ing such an application are addressed in policy memoranda. For ex-
ample, if a U.S. citizen marries a foreign national who entered the 
United States without permission and has been unlawfully present, 
?
 76.  Id. at 4. 
 77.  Id. at 3. 
 78.  Id.
 79.  See generally STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND 
PROCEDURE § 302(4)(b)–(c), (e) (2015). 
 80.  Id. at § 3.02(4)(e)(ii) (2015). 
 81.  See generally Field Offices, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., http://www.uscis.gov/about-us/find-uscis-office/field-offices (last visited Oct. 
29, 2015). 
 82.  See generally Directorates and Program Offices, The Administrative Appeals Office 
(AAO), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
http://www.uscis.gov/about-us/directorates-and-program-offices/administrative-appeals-office-
aao/administrative-appeals-office-aao (last updated Oct. 7, 2015). 
 83.  See generally Family, Administrative Law, supra note 61, at 593–99. 
 84.  Policy Manual, Table of Contents, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (current as of July 21, 2015), 
http://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/HTML/PolicyManual-TableOfContents.html [hereinafter 
USCIS Policy Manual]. 
 85.  Id.
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the amount of unlawful presence will be critical in determining 
whether it is safe for the spouse to leave the United States to apply 
for permanent residence.86 If the spouse has too much unlawful 
presence, the spouse is subject to a three or ten-year bar from reen-
tering the United States upon exit.87 This bar is effective despite 
marriage to a U.S. citizen. The rules addressing the accumulation of 
unlawful presence are largely contained in a thick policy memoran-
dum.88
USCIS has worked to improve the transparency and accessibil-
ity of its policy memoranda in recent years. First, it implemented a 
Draft Memorandum for Comment procedure that allows the public to 
comment on policy memoranda before the documents become offi-
cial.89 Second, USCIS has created its Policy Manual that brings to-
gether its memoranda into one source that is accessible from the 
agency’s website.90
USCIS makes many procedural choices when deciding how to 
adjudicate applications for immigration benefits. It has established a 
vast adjudication system filled with technical procedural choices, in-
cluding which mechanisms USCIS will use to establish these proce-
dures and to fill in statutory gaps. One procedural favorite is clear: 
the guidance document. Just as DHS has used guidance documents 
to announce its prosecutorial discretion policies, through USCIS, 
DHS relies on guidance documents to run the benefits adjudication 
system. 
?
 86.  The spouse is not permitted to “adjust” his or her status to lawful permanent resident 
while in the United States due to the illegal entry. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). That leaves the option of 
“consular processing” outside of the United States. If the spouse leaves the United States, 
however, the spouse may trigger a ban on re-entering the United States. If the spouse has 
more than 180 days of unlawful presence, the spouse is subject to a three-year ban. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I). If the spouse has one year or more of unlawful presence, the ban is 10 
years. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). See also Family, Easing the Guidance Document Di-
lemma, supra note 68, at 2–3. 
 87.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). 
 88.  Interoffice Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir., Domestic Opera-
tions Directorate, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., to Field Leadership, Consolidation of 
Guidance Concerning Unlawful Presence for Purposes of Sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i) and 
212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Act (May 6, 2009) (on file at  
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/200
9/revision_redesign_AFM.PDF).  
 89.  Family, Administrative Law, supra note 61, at 610–15. 
 90.  USCIS Policy Manual, supra note 84. 
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d. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
The final component of DHS discussed here is U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection.91 CBP duties include patrol and surveillance 
of the U.S. borders and the inspection of individuals seeking entry to 
the United States.92 CBP provides an example of reliance on mini-
mal process in immigration law. 
CBP officers staff the U.S. ports of entry and examine the entry 
documents of foreign nationals who wish to enter.93 At the border, 
CBP officers check for required documents and determine admissi-
bility. Congress has created grounds of inadmissibility.94 These are 
categories that describe behavior or circumstances that result in re-
fused entry to the United States even if the foreign national qualifies 
for a lawful immigration category. For example, the spouse of a U.S. 
citizen qualifies in a lawful immigration category due to the spousal 
relationship, but if the foreign national spouse has a criminal history, 
that spouse may be inadmissible despite the marriage to a U.S. citi-
zen.95
If CBP determines that a foreign national is inadmissible, CBP 
may offer to allow the foreign national to withdraw his or her applica-
tion for admission or CBP may place the foreign national in removal 
proceedings.96 These removal hearings would determine whether 
the individual should indeed be denied lawful entry and be returned 
to his or her country. The adjudicators in these hearings are immi-
gration judges, who are employees of another agency, the Depart-
ment of Justice.97 These hearings are more complex than might be 
expected. Questions of admissibility can be quite thorny.98
Congress has delegated to the executive branch the power to 
procedurally expedite the removal of foreign nationals who it deter-
?
 91.  About CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
http://www.cbp.gov/about (last visited Nov. 4, 2015). 
 92.  Border Security, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
http://www.cbp.gov/border-security (last visited Oct. 29, 2015). 
 93.  Immigration Inspection Program, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/overview (last visited Oct. 29, 
2015). 
 94.  8 U.S.C. § 1182. 
 95.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). 
 96.  8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 
 97.  Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 595, 600–04 (2009). 
 98.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). 
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mines to be inadmissible in two different categories.99 These expe-
dited removal procedures allow CBP to avoid the relative formality of 
a removal hearing and to instead make a quick decision to remove, 
subject only to intra-agency supervisory review.100 If a CBP officer 
believes an individual is inadmissible under the misrepresentation or 
lack of proper documents inadmissibility grounds, CBP may remove 
that individual without any hearing.101 There is an exception for 
those who express to a CBP officer that he or she has a fear of per-
secution. Those individuals are sent to a credible fear interview be-
fore an asylum officer.102 If the individual succeeds at the credible 
fear interview, he or she receives an asylum hearing, but may be de-
tained until the hearing.103 If the individual fails, he or she is subject 
to expedited removal unless an immigration judge reverses the de-
termination of a lack of credible fear.104
Expedited removal is an example of minimal process. While ex-
pedited removal is a congressional procedural choice, it still adds to 
our understanding of the procedures used across executive agen-
cies to implement immigration law. Expedited removal provides min-
imal process because it pulls back from the standard level of 
process (a full removal hearing) and instead provides a procedural 
substitute that is less robust. Additionally, while expedited removal is 
a statutory creature, CBP has discretion in how it implements this 
statutory directive. CBP’s implementation of expedited removal has 
been criticized as avoiding even the minimal procedural protections 
mandated by Congress for expedited removal.105
Within DHS, we see ICE, USCIS, and CBP, which are three en-
tities with diverse missions. While there are differences, the work of 
the three units ultimately comes together to exercise significant au-
thority over the admission and removal of foreign nationals. In terms 
of procedure, reliance on guidance documents is prominent, as is 
the absence of robust procedural protections in the context of expe-
dited removal. 
?
 99.  8 U.S.C. § 1225. 
 100.  Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 253.3(B)(7). 
 101.  8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). 
 102.  8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
 103.  Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(i)–(ii). 
 104.  8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii). There is no judicial review of the immigration judge’s 
decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A). 
 105.  Family, A Broader View, supra note 97, at 624–27. 
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2. Department of Labor
The executive also exercises power over immigration law 
through the actions of the Department of Labor (DOL). DOL is 
charged with protecting U.S. workers and plays key roles in certain 
employment-based benefit applications and in employment-based 
workplace enforcement.106 For example, DOL approves prevailing 
wages for certain types of temporary and permanent foreign work-
ers.107 DOL also audits U.S. employers to verify the implementation 
of wage obligations.108
DOL uses a process called Permanent Labor Certification Pro-
gram (PERM) to certify which employers may hire a foreign national 
on a permanent basis.109 The PERM process is often the first step 
for an employer who wishes to sponsor a foreign national for lawful 
permanent residence.110 The PERM process may result in a certifi-
cation that there are no qualified and willing U.S. workers for the 
proposed job, and that the employer is promising to pay the prevail-
ing wage.111 This DOL certification then is sent to USCIS with a peti-
tion to classify the potential employee as a lawful permanent 
resident.112 PERM is an audit-based system.113 In the application for 
a labor certification, employers must complete several attestations, 
including that the employer conducted the required pre-filing re-
cruitment efforts.114
In operating PERM, DOL has promulgated regulations,115 but 
also relies on guidance documents, including a series of 191 
“FAQs.”116 In these questions and answers, DOL addresses a wide 
?
 106.  Wage and Hour Division Administered Immigration Programs, Wage and Hour Divi-
sion, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/immigration/index.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 
2015). 
 107.  Id.
 108.  Id.
 109.  Permanent Labor Certification, Foreign Labor Certification, EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/perm.cfm (last updated Aug. 22, 
2014). 
 110.  Id.
 111.  Id.
 112.  Id.
 113.  Id.
 114.  Id.
 115.  Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. GOV’T PUBL’G OFFICE,
http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title20/20cfr656_main_02.tpl (current as 
of Sept. 30, 2015). 
 116.  OLFC Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, Foreign Labor Certification, EMP’T
& TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
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variety of substantive issues that are crucial to the outcome of a la-
bor certification application. Some of these FAQs are a summary of 
information from a regulation,117 but some provide the only source of 
authority on an issue. For example, an FAQ provides the source of 
instruction of how to report the licenses of a foreign worker to 
DOL.118 DOL does not clarify which FAQs provide the sole source of 
authority for an issue and which clarify a regulatory principle. 
Also, DOL uses a policy memorandum to flesh out details of the 
prevailing wage determination, a key component of the labor certifi-
cation process. DOL explains on its website that it uses a guidance 
document to issue prevailing wage determinations, and links to it.119
The document is thirty-six pages long. The document references a 
prevailing wage regulation but states that the document provides 
“policy and procedural guidance” to DOL employees making prevail-
ing wage determinations.120 According to DOL’s appellate adminis-
trative body that hears appeals of prevailing wage determinations,121
this guidance document “outlines a step-by-step, standardized ap-
proach for determining the appropriate [prevailing wage].”122
As an example of the types of issues addressed in this guid-
ance document, it directs agency adjudicators what to do when an 
employer’s job description contains supervisory duties. The memo-
randum states: “In this new guidance, an employer’s job requirement 
for supervisory duties will not automatically warrant a determination 
at the highest wage level because the wages for supervisory occu-
pations already account for the supervision of employees.”123
Like DHS, DOL makes a variety of procedural choices when it 
chooses how to administer its corner of immigration law. Those pro-
cedural choices include reliance on guidance documents. 
?
 http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/faqsanswers.cfm#Perm_Program (last updated Aug. 3, 
2015). 
 117.  See id.
 118.  See id.
 119.  Prevailing Wages (PERM, H-2B, H-1B, H-1B1 and E-3), Foreign Labor Certification,
EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
 http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/pwscreens.cfm (last updated July 11, 2014). 
 120.  Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance: Nonagricultural Immigration Pro-
grams, EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (revised Nov. 2009), 
http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/pdf/NPWHC_Guidance_Revised_11_2009.pdf. 
 121.  20 C.F.R. § 656.26(a); 20 C.F.R. § 655.11(a); 20 C.F.R. § 656.41(a). 
 122.  Payless Shoe Source, 2013-PWD-00004 (U.S. Dep’t of Labor 2013) (Order Affirming 
Denial of Certification). 
 123.  Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance, supra note 120, at 13.  
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3. Department of Justice
The Department of Justice (DOJ), another executive branch 
agency, also exercises immigration law power. DOJ houses the Ex-
ecutive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR),124 which is the home 
of immigration judges and members of the appellate Board of Immi-
gration Appeals. Immigration judges and Board members are em-
ployees of DOJ and work for the Attorney General.125 These 
adjudicators are not Administrative Law Judges and lack the deci-
sional independence enjoyed by Administrative Law Judges.126 In a 
removal proceeding, an immigration judge decides whether the De-
partment of Homeland Security’s charge of removability will stick, or 
whether a foreign national is entitled to relief from removal.127 The 
availability of relief is limited, as Congress has set detailed, non-
discretionary criteria,128 but nevertheless, for those who do not re-
ceive a grant of prosecutorial discretion, it is up to an executive 
branch immigration judge to determine whether relief is available 
under the statute. The Board of Immigration Appeals is the appellate 
agency adjudicatory body and renders a final order of removal.129
Problems with immigration adjudication within DOJ are well 
documented. Challenges include record-breaking case backlogs in 
the immigration courts,130 too few immigration judges,131 a lack of 
lawyers for foreign nationals,132 a lack of decisional independence 
for immigration adjudicators,133 inconsistent decision-making,134 re-
?
 124.  EOIR Mission, EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/eoir (last visited Oct. 29, 2015). 
 125.  Family, A Broader View, supra note 97, at 600–08. 
 126.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.10 (“The immigration judges are attorneys whom the Attorney Gen-
eral appoints as administrative judges”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (“The Board members shall 
be attorneys appointed by the Attorney General to act as the Attorney General’s delegates in 
the cases that come before them.”) 
 127.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.10; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.37. 
 128.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. 1229b. 
 129.  The immigration judge’s order becomes the final removal order if there is no appeal 
to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 
 130.  As of September 2015, there were 456,644 cases waiting to be adjudicated in the 
immigration courts. Backlog of Pending Cases in Immigration Courts as of September 2015,
TRACImmigration, TRAC REPORTS,
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/apprep_backlog.php (last visited Oct. 
29, 2015).  
 131.  Family, A Broader View, supra note 97, at 600–04. 
 132.  Id.
 133.  Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 369 (2006). 
 134.  JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM 
ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (2009). 
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 47 Side B      12/28/2015   14:43:02
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 47 Side B      12/28/2015   14:43:02
3?FAMILY?FINAL?(DO?NOT?DELETE)? 12/24/2015??5:28?PM?
80 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 91:1
strictions on judicial review of removal decisions,135 efforts to further 
restrict federal court oversight,136 and applicable substantive law that 
is harsh and leaves little room for adjudicator discretion.137
Even though DOJ’s adjudication of immigration removal cases 
is deeply flawed, perhaps even more disturbing are efforts to divert 
cases from even receiving that flawed process.138 Through waivers, 
expedited removal, and the criminalization of immigration law, many 
removal cases are decided outside of DOJ’s adjudicatory process. 
For example, forty-four percent of removals in Fiscal Year 2013 
were expedited removals.139 If a foreign national is subject to expe-
dited removal, waives the right to a hearing, or concedes removabil-
ity through a criminal process, then the foreign national will never 
enter DOJ’s civil immigration adjudication system. 
Removal adjudication within DOJ, and efforts to divert foreign 
nationals from DOJ’s adjudication processes, are examples of mini-
mal process. Many of the problems with removal adjudication within 
DOJ can be traced back to Congress. For example, DOJ has not re-
ceived sufficient increases in funding to cope with the increased en-
forcement efforts that have resulted in the need for more removal 
hearings.140 And it is Congress, of course, who has limited judicial 
review of agency removal decisions. Regardless of the source, 
however, this troubled adjudication system is an example of a com-
plex procedural system that provides minimal process, if any pro-
cess at all. 
?
 135.  8 U.S.C. § 1252. 
 136.  Jill E. Family, Stripping Judicial Review During Immigration Reform: The Certificate 
of Reviewability, 8 NEV. L.J. 499 (2008); Jill E. Family, Removing the Distraction of Delay, 64 
CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 99 (2014). 
 137.  Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to the Im-
migration Adjudication Crisis, 59 UNIV. KAN. L. REV. 541, 551–63 (2011). 
 138.  Family, A Broader View, supra note 97; see also Jennifer Lee Koh, Waiving Due 
Process (Goodbye): Stipulated Orders of Removal and the Crisis in Immigration Adjudication,
91 N.C. L. REV. 475 (2013); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and 
the Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 1–2 (2014). 
 139.  John F. Simanski, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS,
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2013 (2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2013.pdf. 
 140.  Family, Beyond Decisional Independence, supra note 137, at 564–66; Backlog of 
Pending Cases in Immigration Courts as of September 2015, TRACImmigration, TRAC 
REPORTS, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/apprep_backlog.php (last 
visited Oct. 29, 2015). 
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4. Department of State 
The Department of State (DOS) operates the U.S. consulates 
that adjudicate applications for visas to travel to the United States. 
Obtaining a visa is an essential yet independent step for many for-
eign nationals who are abroad and who wish to enter the United 
States legally.141 Even if USCIS approves a foreign national for a 
certain category (spouse of a U.S. citizen or temporary worker for a 
U.S. company, for example), that foreign national must obtain a visa 
from DOS in that category to be able to travel to the United States. 
Obtaining a visa is a complex, multistep process.142 The pro-
cess requires the completion of forms, paying fees, and often at-
tending an in-person interview.143 The decision whether to issue a 
visa depends on a foreign national’s admissibility to the United 
States.144 As explained above, Congress, through the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, has established categories of individuals who 
are not admissible, no matter whether they fall into a legal immigra-
tion category.145
Despite the fact that DOS operates the consulates, the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security also plays a large role in the visa issu-
ance process. DHS has the authority to refuse to issue a visa, as 
does DOS.146 Therefore, while visa applicants may interact only with 
DOS employees at the consulate, the Department of Homeland Se-
curity plays a role behind the scenes. 
If a visa application is denied, the main recourse is to apply 
again. Because of the consular non-reviewability doctrine, judicial 
review is minimal. Under the purest form of this doctrine, executive 
consular decisions are untouchable; the courts play no role in re-
viewing them.147 The Supreme Court has shown willingness, how-
ever, to at least demand a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason 
?
 141.  One exception to this requirement is the Visa Waiver Program, which allows nation-
als of certain countries to travel to the United States as a visitor without first obtaining a visa in 
the individual’s passport. 8 U.S.C. § 1187 (2014). 
 142.  See, e.g., Applying for a Visa, EMBASSY OF THE U.S. LONDON – UK,
http://london.usembassy.gov/niv/apply.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2015). 
 143.  Id.
 144.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). Both CBP and DOS make admissibility determinations. If a for-
eign national needs a visa, the admissibility determination will be made twice.   
 145.  Id.
 146.  RUTH E. WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41093, VISA SECURITY POLICY: ROLES OF 
THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND HOMELAND SECURITY (2010), 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/138767.pdf. 
 147.  MAILMAN &YALE-LOEHR, supra note 79, at § 3.11 (2015). 
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for a visa denial.148 This minimal protection is at least greater protec-
tion than concluding that visa application decisions are non-
justiciable. 
The Supreme Court heard a procedural challenge to DOS’ ad-
judication of a visa application during its October 2014 term in Kerry
v. Din.149 Din, a U.S. citizen, challenged the denial of her husband’s 
application for an immigrant visa to join her in the United States.150
DOS denied her husband’s application for a visa because DOS de-
termined her husband to be inadmissible to the United States.151
DOS cited to a statutory section in communicating the visa denial. 
The statutory section, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B), addresses terrorist 
activities.152 It includes a range of activities, from engaging in terror-
ist activities to providing material support to a terrorist organization. 
Essentially, by citing to this broad statutory section, DOS told Din 
and her husband that he is inadmissible because he engaged in at 
least one of the many types of activities described in the statute, but 
did not tell him exactly which one. 
Din argued that the DOS denial violated her procedural due 
process rights because DOS did not adequately explain the reason 
why it determined her husband to be inadmissible and therefore inel-
igible for a visa.153 Citation to the statutory section alone, she ar-
gued, was not constitutionally adequate because the statutory 
section encompasses a wide range of behaviors.154 Din believed 
that she was entitled to a more specific and detailed explanation of 
why DOS determined her husband to be inadmissible under that 
particular statute.155
A fractured Supreme Court produced a majority only as to the 
result—Din lost. Three justices (Scalia, Thomas, and Roberts) be-
lieved that Din’s interest in having her husband receive a visa does 
not qualify as “life, liberty or property” under the Due Process 
Clause.156 According to these justices, Din had no eligible protected 
?
 148.  Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
 149.  Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015).  
 150.  Id. at 2131. Din’s husband did not challenge the visa denial because the plenary 
power doctrine eliminates the constitutional rights of foreign nationals applying for admission 
to the United States. Family, Threats, supra note 4. 
 151.  Kerry, 135 S. Ct. at 2132. 
 152.  Id.
 153.  Id. at 2132, 2140–42, 2144–45. 
 154.  Id. at 2145–46. 
 155.  Id.
 156.  Id. at 2138. 
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interest. Two justices (Kennedy and Alito) determined that the Court 
need not reach the issue of whether Din held an interest protected 
by the Due Process Clause, because even if she did, the process 
the government provided was adequate under the “facially legitimate 
and bona fide” standard.157 Four justices (Breyer, Ginsburg, So-
tomayor, and Kagan) dissented and explained that Din’s interest in 
her husband’s visa application is protected by the Due Process 
Clause and that the procedure provided (the citation to the broad 
statutory section) was inadequate.158
While it is still an open question whether a U.S. citizen’s interest 
in a spouse’s visa application is a protected liberty interest, the re-
sult of this case is that it was adequate for the government only to 
provide cursory information about why it denied Din’s husband’s visa 
application. A simple citation to a broad statutory section that en-
compasses a variety of behavior was acceptable. 
Din is another illustration of the force of minimal process in im-
migration law. For Din and her husband, enjoyment of their marriage 
inside of the United States is not a possibility. To be together, the 
two will need to live somewhere other than the United States. The 
possibility of living together in the United States was extinguished 
without a detailed explanation. According to the Court, she was not 
due anything more. 
B. Procedural Themes Across Agencies and Questions for Fur-
ther   Inquiry
The procedures discussed in Part A lead to a few key themes. 
First, executive procedural power over immigration law is not a 
monolith. Second, guidance documents play a prominent role in the 
exercise of executive procedural power over immigration law. Third, 
minimal process also is a conspicuous feature. 
Even this introductory discussion of the procedural choices and 
mechanisms that accompany the executive procedural power over 
immigration law reveals that referring to the “administration of immi-
gration law” is overly broad. The administration of immigration law 
involves six different main components, each with a unique function 
and mission. At times some of these six units must work together; at 
times they are autonomous. At times, some units repeat tasks per-
?
 157.  Id. at 2139. 
 158.  Id. at 2141–42. 
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formed by another unit. Despite that each of these six units ultimate-
ly report to one president, each has made its own procedural choic-
es, and some have had procedural choices imposed by Congress. 
Improving executive procedural power over immigration law will re-
quire many tiny brush strokes, and not one large stroke. 
As explained above, the implementation of immigration law re-
lies on guidance documents. While this reliance is problematic, the 
use of guidance documents is common across administrative law. In 
fact, it would be more helpful conceptually to think of notice and 
comment rulemaking under the APA as the exception. This is actual-
ly an area where immigration law’s troubles converge with the main-
stream.159 Agency use and reliance on guidance documents is a 
large question looming over all of administrative law. 
The fact that the problem pervades administrative law is not an 
excuse to ignore the issue within the context of immigration law, 
however. USCIS has attempted some improvements, but the use of 
guidance documents in immigration law will present an important 
line of inquiry for years to come. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia and I 
have each called for USCIS to decrease its reliance on guidance 
documents, even if the APA would permit USCIS to use a guidance 
document.160 Also, I have called on USCIS to develop Good Guid-
ance Practices to steer its use of sub-regulatory rules.161
The use of guidance documents is tied closely to the issue of 
transparency in the administration of immigration law. Guidance 
documents in immigration law present a procedural mismatch. 
Guidance documents are a procedural mismatch because guidance 
documents are one of the most convoluted procedural mechanisms 
in administrative law, and immigration law arguably provides the 
least sophisticated group of regulated parties: immigrants who may 
lack resources and who may not even speak English. With guidance 
documents, the applicable rules are not as visible because they are 
in a memorandum. Unrepresented foreign nationals may not even 
know to look for a memorandum, and if they did, it is not clear if 
those individuals would understand the difference between a memo-
based rule and a regulation or a statute.162 Additionally, even law-
?
 159.  Family, Administrative Law, supra note 61, at 616. 
 160.  Id. at 615; WADHIA, supra note 1, chapter 7; Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion, supra note 1, at 296 (recommending notice and comment rulemaking for deferred ac-
tion); Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 3, at 21–27. 
 161.  Family, Easing the Guidance Document Dilemma, supra note 68, at 8. 
 162.  Id. at 6–7. 
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yers have complained that the memorandum formulation process is 
a mystery to them, and that memo-based rules may unexpectedly 
change. 
Guidance documents and transparency concerns also converge 
in the context of prosecutorial discretion.163 While the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion gives the president the power to shape the 
population of foreign nationals in the United States, few procedural 
protections accompany the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Pro-
fessor Wadhia has raised important concerns about the lack of 
transparency surrounding prosecutorial discretion.164
For an individual outside the DACA initiative (and perhaps 
eventually DAPA), there is no real application procedure short of 
asking an ICE officer to consider an exercise of prosecutorial discre-
tion.165 An unrepresented individual may not even know that prose-
cutorial discretion exists, let alone know how to ask for it. The non-
DACA prosecutorial discretion memoranda envision a system where 
ICE officers themselves will initiate consideration.166 Therefore, a 
foreign national might not even know whether prosecutorial discre-
tion was considered at all, let alone be aware of reasons why ICE 
may have decided to prosecute anyway. Also, even if a foreign na-
tional or his or her attorney is aware of ICE’s memoranda-based en-
forcement priorities, the recourse for being placed in removal 
proceedings even if a person does not fall within the enforcement 
priorities is a mystery. 
DACA has a more transparent procedural framework (and per-
haps DAPA would be more transparent). USCIS maintains a portion 
of its website dedicated to the DACA application procedure.167 There 
is a designated application form accompanied by detailed applica-
tion instructions as well as detailed explanation of the criteria for eli-
?
 163.  Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 1, at 60 (discussing how the Obama admin-
istration promotes transparency through its implementation of DACA and its proposed imple-
mentation at DAPA). 
 164.  Wadhia, Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 1, at 294–97; Wadhia, Sharing
Secrets, supra note 3, 48–60; see also Rodríguez, Constraint Through Delegation, supra note 
1, at 1789–90. 
 165.  WADHIA, supra note 1, at 17–18, 55–57; Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 3, at 
48–51. 
 166.  Id.
 167.  Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last 
updated Aug. 3, 2015). 
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gibility for consideration (including videos, infographics, and ta-
bles).168 There is also some explanation that the “DA” in “DACA” 
stands for “Deferred Action,” which is not a legal immigration sta-
tus.169 Also, USCIS has published detailed reports containing data 
describing those who have applied for and those who have received 
deferred action under DACA.170 Addressing review of a decision to 
deny deferred action to a DACA applicant, the website states: “If 
USCIS decides not to grant DACA in your case, you cannot appeal 
the decision or file a motion to reopen or reconsider. USCIS will not 
review its discretionary determinations.”171
While DACA is more organized and transparent in the sense 
that there is an application form and therefore an established adjudi-
catory process, and in the sense that USCIS issues reports on 
DACA, DACA is based on a memo. In fact, many of the details are 
contained in a “Frequently Asked Questions” document, and not 
even in an authored memorandum.172 While USCIS has been more 
open about how it will adjudicate DACA applications and what 
standards it will apply in deciding whether to grant deferred action 
under DACA, the process and the standards rest on easily-shifted 
ground. USCIS changes and updates its DACA Frequently Asked 
Questions simply by posting an updated version on its website. A 
new president may choose to eliminate the program altogether and 
may do so with little procedural fanfare. 
Also, the efforts to be more transparent about deferred action 
have opened up DHS to criticism that because it has listed criteria 
and has established an application process, it has violated the APA 
by not using notice and comment rulemaking.173 Because DHS real-
ly meant to establish a legally binding rule, the argument goes, DHS 
?
 168.  Id.
 169.  Id.
 170.  U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIVIDUALS REQUESTING AND APPROVED FOR DEFERRED ACTION FOR 
CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (DACA) (2014),
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Deferred%20Action%20for%20Ch
ildhood%20Arrivals/USCIS-DACA-Characteristics-Data-2014-7-10.pdf. 
 171.  Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last 
updated Aug. 3, 2015). 
 172.  Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-
arrivals-process/frequently-asked-questions (last updated June 15, 2015). 
 173.  Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 1, at 60. 
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committed a procedural error by choosing to use guidance docu-
ments over the mechanism of notice and comment rulemaking.174
Some believe that because DHS has laid out criteria, the central 
administration has extinguished the discretion of individual enforce-
ment officers, forcing officers to grant deferred action if the criteria 
are met.175 As explained above, a policy memorandum is not sup-
posed to be legally binding. 
These efforts at transparency, therefore, have potentially placed 
the agency at a litigation disadvantage when determining whether 
the agency properly invoked the guidance document exception to 
notice and comment rulemaking. If this argument succeeds, then an 
agency is better off to say nothing if it wants its procedural choice to 
be accepted. In implementing DACA, DHS could have said nothing, 
released no memoranda, and never posted answers to frequently 
asked questions. It could have let front line officers randomly decide 
when to grant deferred action with no guidance from central admin-
istration. Foreign nationals would be left to guess who might qualify, 
and would be unsure about the procedure for seeking deferred ac-
tion. The resolution of this conundrum is especially important to im-
migration law, where the regulated parties are individual foreign 
nationals who are often unrepresented.176 Transparency is tremen-
dously important. 
There is an issue here that cuts to the heart of an unresolved 
issue in administrative law. When courts say that a policy memoran-
dum cannot be binding, who must not be bound?177 Is central admin-
?
 174.  Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015). 
 175.  Id. at 668–70. 
 176.  See Family, Administrative Law, supra note 61, at app. A (showing representation 
rates before USCIS); FY 2014 Statistics Yearbook, EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, at F1(Mar. 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/03/16/fy14syb.pdf 
(showing a 55% representation rate in immigration court for fiscal year 2014). 
 177.  See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 290 F.3d 377, 384–85 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (invalidating a guidance document because it bound applicants); McLouth Steel Prods. 
Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1320–21 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (invalidating a guidance document 
where the court determined the agency to be “close-minded and dismissive”); see also Robert 
A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should 
Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1315 (1992) (arguing 
that policy memoranda should not be used to bind the public even if there is only a practical 
binding effect); The President and Immigration Law Redux, supra note 1, at 67–68, n.296 (de-
scribing critics of DAPA as promoting the idea “that enforcement discretion be located exclu-
sively in the hands of line-level enforcement personnel”); Michael Kagan, Binding the 
Enforcers: The Administrative Law Struggle Behind President Obama’s Immigration Actions,
50 U. RICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016); Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Proce-
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istration able to bind lower level agency adjudicators through policy 
memoranda? Or, is it acceptable for central administration to bind its 
own employees, as long as it leaves open two possibilities: (1) that 
central administration may change its mind and (2) that a regulated 
party may argue that a different rule, other than the one in the policy 
memorandum, should apply. For example, the DAPA memorandum 
instructs lower level DHS employees to consider certain criteria, and 
then to decide whether to exercise discretion to grant deferred ac-
tion. Does the direction provided to the vast network of adjudicators 
doom the procedural choice? If the answer to that question is yes, 
that would present major organizational challenges, especially in an 
area of law where lower level adjudicators have not been shy to re-
sist directives from central administration.178 If the answer is yes, 
then what does that mean for prosecutorial discretion in immigration 
law in general? May central administration provide any guidance as 
to when prosecutorial discretion should be exercised? 
The final theme, minimal process, is another one to watch. This 
theme of minimal process is not as developed across all agencies 
with authority over immigration law. As our view expands, we can 
see how minimal process creeps into various aspects of executive 
immigration power, including the visa adjudication process. This 
wider view gives us a fuller picture of the executive branch’s posture 
towards procedural protections in immigration law. Reliance on min-
imal procedures signals that the executive is not investing resources 
in more robust protections. 
This tendency toward minimal process becomes even more 
significant as we begin to imagine the potential future of executive 
power over immigration law. For executive power that relies on a 
delegation from Congress, the sources of procedural protection are 
any that Congress may provide and the Due Process Clause. But 
what if the Supreme Court clarifies what it has left cloudy: What if 
the Supreme Court clarifies that the President has some measure of 
inherent power over immigration law?179 What procedural protec-
?
dural Review of Guidance Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331, 348–49 (2011) (exploring the pa-
rameters of the binding nature of guidance documents). 
 178.  See Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 1, at 74; Cuéllar, supra note, 1 at 53–54; 
Kagan, supra note 177, at Part III; Nina Rabin, Victims or Criminals? Discretion, Sorting, and 
Bureaucratic Culture in the U.S. Immigration System, 23 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUS. (2014). 
 179.  Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Supreme 
Court confirmed the President’s authority to recognize foreign sovereigns and struck down a 
congressional statute that interfered with that power. This case is instructive in that it repre-
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tions would apply? Would only the Due Process Clause apply? 
Would there be some mechanism to influence the executive to vol-
untarily impose greater procedural protections? 
III. CONCLUSION
The renewed scholarly focus on the executive branch’s power 
over immigration law must include study of the procedures the ex-
ecutive uses to implement immigration law. Looking across execu-
tive branch agencies charged with enforcing immigration law, the 
overall picture is not one of robust procedural protections. This wider 
view is especially significant as scholars explore the potential 
boundaries of the president’s inherent authority over immigration 
law.
While the APA may permit agencies to make the procedural 
choice to use guidance documents, immigration agencies should 
think carefully about when and how they use them. Guidance docu-
ments are a necessary and important feature of administrative law, 
but the drawbacks of this procedural mechanism have special im-
portance in immigration law. Guidance documents can be a useful 
tool for explaining information in plain English, but guidance docu-
ments rest on shifting ground and foreign nationals may not even 
know they exist. Even if they are known, their legal significance may 
be confusing to foreign nationals, and they do not provide legally en-
forceable rights. 
While courts may hold that immigration procedures that provide 
minimal process are constitutional, such as the expedited removal 
program and vague explanations for visa denials, the executive 
branch should provide more process. Political and historical forces 
have pushed us toward a time of strong executive discretionary 
power over immigration law. With that power is a need for greater 
procedural protections. 
?
sents an effort to separate out power between the President and Congress and recognizes a 
type of power that belongs solely to the President. 
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